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THE FUTURE OF THE SANDWICH ISLANDS.

BY CLAUS SPRECKELS.

THE death of King Kalakaua has aroused public interest in Hawaiian affairs. It was generally understood that the prime object of Kalakaua's visit to this country was to promote closer relations with the United States. His death while negotiations were pending was somewhat unfortunate, because it is not absolutely certain that the policy of the Hawaiian government under his successor will run on precisely the same lines. But while there is room for doubt on this head, there is also a reasonable probability that Kalakaua's death will not materially change the drift of public policy.

The Hawaiian Islands are American in sentiment and sympathy. Visitors from the United States to Honolulu feel themselves at home the moment they land from the steamer. There is nothing in the social conditions to remind them that they are on foreign soil. Hotels and stores are conducted on the American plan. American money is the circulating medium. Outdoor sports and popular amusements are fashioned on the American pattern, and the Fourth of July is a national holiday. Conversely, when a Hawaiian resident visits America, he finds himself at home in San Francisco or anywhere else in the United States.

The native Hawaiian people look to America as their best friend. They received their civilization from it, and they have constant intercourse with it. In other words, they know that their material prosperity depends upon the friendship of the United States. But they are impressionable and easily led. This is the weak point in Hawaiian affairs. It has been the cause of the recent trouble in the islands, and will continue to be a source of uncertainty and weakness while the Hawaiian natives continue to be influenced by their old traditions and customs.

There is a small but influential element on the islands which, if not exactly antipathetic, is not inclined to be favorably disposed

to American ascendancy. This element may be grouped as representing British and German sentiment, while the Portuguese, by reason of their numbers and thrift, are fast acquiring political and commercial importance. At present the leaning of the Portuguese is toward America, but the sentiment is not very pronounced. The Japanese are likely to make their influence felt through their government, which, it has been hinted, would probably demand the suffrage for such of its people domiciled on the islands as may be able to comply with the requirements of the election law; but there is no danger of any interference from Tokio in the foreign relations of Hawaii with the United States or any other country. Should the Japanese receive the franchise, possibilities would be opened, however, for political combinations of various kinds, some of which might be inimical to American influence.

The Chinese form the remaining element in the Hawaiian Kingdom which might possibly become hostile to American supremacy. But the Chinese do not take any part in public affairs as a rule, although they took an opportunity of exhibiting their strength when it was proposed by the late reform government to initiate stringent anti-Chinese legislation. They assembled in public meeting and pronounced against the proposed legislation, and as a consequence it was quietly dropped. This incident gave the Chinese confidence in themselves, and they are not at all likely to abate one particle of their importance or pretensions. But Chinamen look upon all foreign countries with the same feelings of aversion, and therefore may be regarded as passive on any question that might arise in Hawaii between the United States and either England or Germany. I am inclined to think, all other things being equal, that the Chinese in Hawaii would give the preference to the United States. However, it must be remembered that the Chinese are a people who do not permit sentiment to influence them, and may therefore be expected to favor that which they think would pay best.

This brief statement of conflicting national sentiment on the Hawaiian Islands is necessary to a proper understanding of the situation there. It will be observed that the only potent factors, exclusive of native Hawaiians, are the American, British, and German nationalities. I have grouped the last two together for convenience, although they are very far from pursuing a common

aim outside of business. As I have said, however, American influence greatly preponderates in every department of government and branch of industry. The banks of the kingdom are conducted by Americans. Of the capital invested in sugar plantations and mills, estimated at \$29,665,990 in 1889, \$22,537,210 belonged to Americans, \$5,090,830 to British, \$1,756,300 to Germans, and the balance to native Hawaiians and other nationalities. The carrying trade of the islands is in American hands, and the Pacific coast is the consuming and supply market for the entire Hawaiian group.

It is only natural, from a consideration of these facts, that American citizens should take a deep interest in Hawaiian affairs, and that the death of King Kalakaua at San Francisco, so soon after a native uprising in his capital, should cause anxious speculations as to the future. The late revolutionary movement, which resulted in the proclamation of an amended constitution, might, under favoring circumstances, be successfully imitated by the reactionary party, although Wilcox failed in his attempt: in that case how would American investments be affected? and would the United States government retain its influence over Hawaiian affairs? These questions have been asked frequently of late; and while it is not my purpose to attempt to answer them, for the reason that the future is uncertain, I do not hesitate to say that the chances are against any organized attempt to change existing political conditions. But much might be accomplished without resort to violence, and it is far more difficult to guard against a stealthy than against an open attack.

The commercial importance of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States cannot very well be overestimated, for the reason that their great natural resources are only beginning to be developed. And what has heretofore been accomplished has been mainly done by American skill, capital, and enterprise. The total foreign trade of the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1876, when the reciprocity treaty with the United States went into operation, was \$3,811,187. The sugar export for that year was about 16,000 tons. For 1889, under the stimulus of limited reciprocity, the sugar export of the islands was about 125,000 tons, every pound of which was marketed in the United States, employing skilled labor in the refining business and dependent trades, while the total foreign commerce was \$19,313,131, of which \$13,972,579, or

72.34 per cent., was with the United States. The Collector-General of Customs of the Hawaiian Islands, in his annual report for 1889, says : "The trade with the United States has increased 5.78 per cent. during the year, and is now 79.10 per cent. of our entire imports. Our exports virtually all go to the United States. The United States received the bulk of our trade both in exports and imports ; Great Britain received 3.45 per cent. ; and China and Japan 1.10 per cent."

In the shipping trade of the Hawaiian Islands the American flag has the preference, and in this respect the Hawaiian trade is an exception worth noting. The Collector-General's returns for 1889, from which I quote, state the percentages of shipping employed in the foreign trade of the Hawaiian Kingdom as follows : "American, 72.34 ; Hawaiian (nearly all built on the Pacific coast), 19.19 ; British, 5.90 ; German, 2.04 ; all other, .53." The percentages of shipping for 1890, when published, will tell even better for the American flag. These figures emphasize the fact, however, that, while the stars and stripes are being driven from the high seas by foreign competition, the reciprocity treaty with Hawaii, a mere dot in the wide Pacific Ocean, has created a trade of which Americans have the virtual monopoly. Indeed, it is to this fact alone, and to the wise and far-seeing policy embodied in the Hawaiian treaty, that San Francisco ranks so high on the list of American ports for American shipping. Yet further, the commercial standing of San Francisco is very largely dependent upon its Hawaiian trade, as the following exhibit for 1890 will show :

	EXPORTS TO.	IMPORTS FROM.
Hawaii.....	\$4,179,311	\$12,363,450
Central America.....	1,789,046	3,012,517
Mexico.....	1,570,646	800,061
Ecuador.....	155,727	99,083
Chile.....	27,935	416,751
China.....	3,114,757	5,699,638
Japan.....	717,363	7,847,974
Great Britain.....	16,908,094	4,685,320
British Columbia.....	871,613	1,570,052
Australasia.....	1,402,316	1,195,047
East India.....	495,035	2,885,737
France.....	2,182,322	1,216,395
French colonies.....	353,951	213,107
Belgium.....	1,089,066	725,875
Germany.....	167,593	1,156,008
Italy.....	158,271
Holland.....	1,600
Cuba.....	407,306
Philippines.....	59,667	957,954
Asiatic Russia.....	128,937	416,751
Brazil.....	430,295
Peru.....	257,776
Other countries.....	58,727

This exhibit demonstrates conclusively the great value of the Hawaiian trade to San Francisco and the country at large. It is of the utmost consequence, therefore, that it should be conserved and extended. There is no other instance on record where so large a trade has been developed with 80,000 people, which is about the total population of the Hawaiian Islands.

These figures, which deal with merchandise only, speak for themselves. They are more convincing than any argument I could use, if our public men would only condescend to consider them. They attest the commercial value of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States, and suggest that the true policy of this country is to strengthen, and not impair, American influence in Hawaiian affairs. The necessity for pursuing such an enlightened policy consistently and continuously must also suggest itself to thoughtful men when it is remembered that the Hawaiian Islands will become the key to the north Pacific Ocean upon the completion of the Nicaragua Canal, which will bring the maritime powers of Europe within striking distance of San Francisco. The power which holds Pearl Harbor, close to Honolulu, and is in direct communication with it by cable, will be mistress of the seas in the north Pacific.

The possession of Pearl Harbor as a naval station has been guaranteed to the United States government by treaty for a number of years. Why not improve the harbor and make this condition of occupation perpetual by treaty conferring perpetual reciprocal advantages upon Hawaii? The overshadowing influence of the United States in the industries and trade of the Hawaiian Islands renders it eminently proper that it should protect its commerce and the investment of its citizens against any possible combination or attack from without. This should not, and, indeed, need not, involve any attack upon the independence of the islands. No one could be more opposed to their annexation to the United States than I am. It could do no possible good, and might do a great deal of injury; but only good could result from the plan I have suggested. It would restore confidence in the stability of Hawaiian institutions, and stimulate industrial enterprise on the islands. This would necessarily react favorably upon American trade, and help to build up the shipping interests of this country, which are now at so low an ebb.

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